The Dutch Answer to Drug Tourism Within Southern Dutch Municipalities An assessment of the 2012 revised drug policy by Kirin Pepijn Moonen
The Dutch Answer to Drug Tourism Within
Southern Dutch Municipalities An assessment of
the 2012 revised drug policy
著者 Kirin Pepijn Moonen
journal or
publication title
DSSR Discussion Papers
number 102
page range 1-41
year 2019-10
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10097/00126432
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
? Data Science and Service Research 
Discussion Paper  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discussion Paper No. 102 
 
The Dutch Answer to Drug Tourism Within 
Southern Dutch Municipalities 
An assessment of the 2012 revised drug policy 
 
Kirin Pepijn Moonen 
October, 2019 
Center for Data Science and Service Research 
Graduate School of Economic and Management 
Tohoku University 
27-1 Kawauchi, Aobaku 
Sendai 980-8576, JAPAN 
 
THE DUTCH ANSWER TO DRUG TOURISM WITHIN DUTCH MUNICIPALITIES 1 
The Dutch Answer to Drug Tourism Within Southern Dutch Municipalities 
An assessment of the 2012 revised drug policy 
Kirin Pepijn Moonen 
Tohoku University, Japan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Address for correspondence: 
Tohoku University, Graduate School of Economics and Management 
Sendai, Aoba Ward, Kawauchi 27-1, 980-8576 
Tel: +815055329767 
Email: moonenkipe@gmail.com 
THE DUTCH ANSWER TO DRUG TOURISM WITHIN DUTCH MUNICIPALITIES 2 
Abstract 
The Netherlands has since the 1970s focused on decriminalizing to address the issue of 
drugs within society. As a result of implementing this decriminalization policy, commercial 
establishments called coffee shops quickly appeared afterwards to meet market demand for 
marijuana within the Netherlands. The growth of this newly established marijuana industry was 
tolerated by the Dutch government leading to an eventual regulatory framework of the AHOJ-G 
criterion. However, even with the framework in place, the number of tourists seeking to 
experience marijuana continued to exponentially increase leading to issues of drug tourism and 
other associated nuisances. In 2012, the Dutch government selected three provinces in the South 
of the Netherlands where marijuana would no longer be sold to non-residents in order to stymie 
drug tourism. Qualitative studies on this issue found that there was a significant reduction in drug 
tourism as a result of implementing the policy in 2012 but was coincided with a rise in illicit 
drug activity due to the legal purchase channel being shut-down for non-residents. 
The aim of this study is to analyze the impact of the 2012 sales restriction on coffee shop 
municipalities within these three provinces and the subsequent economic impact on local firms. 
Propensity score matching was used to create a control group of coffee shop municipalities that 
were similar to the treated coffee shop municipalities on the basis of observed characteristics 
with socio-economic data from the public Statline database maintained by the Dutch Statistics 
Bureau. Several robustness checks were conducted to ensure the validity of the matching 
procedure. The difference-in-difference model used municipal drug crime data from the Statline 
database for the years 2009 to 2014 to analyze the impact on committed drug crimes. Findings 
revealed that the policy did not have a significant impact on drug crimes within treated areas 
even after controlling for municipal characteristics. Placebo test of the policy presented that the 
policy had a lagged treatment effect which can be attributed to the sharp increase in illicit drug 
market activity in 2012 due to policy disrupting the legal purchase channel of marijuana. 
Therefore, this study shows that even though prior literature cites that drug tourism was 
significantly reduced, limiting sales to residents did not lead to an increase in either soft- or hard 
drug crimes indicating that the policy had an overall beneficial impact on reducing illicit drug 
market activity  
 
Keywords:  Drug tourism, difference-in-difference, propensity score matching 
JEL classification: R11, K23 
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Introduction 
The continuing trend of changing perceptions and acceptance of drugs within society, 
especially marijuana, has led to a string of sweeping legislative changes ranging from 
decriminalization to the existence of fully legalized recreational marijuana with the creation of 
an multimillion dollar industry to meet popular demand as can be seen in earlier cases such as 
Amendment 64 in Colorado and Initiative 502 in Washington. The increase in acceptance of 
marijuana for medicinal and recreational usage around the world gives government institutions 
an additional lucrative revenue stream as documented by Henchman (2014) and Henchman and 
Scarboro (2016). However, the benefits of allowing drug tourists are often accompanied with its 
numerous documented negatives such as nuisance and crime as has been documented in The 
Netherlands (Snippe, Naayer, and Bieleman, 2006; Van Ooyen-Houben, Bieleman, and Korf, 
2014; Nabben et al, 2015). Therefore, policy makers within urban areas with the prime potential 
of experiencing drug tourism will look for literature and statistical evidence on what policies can 
effectively reduce drug tourism and its associated pollution.  
The motivation of this study is to analyze the impact of restricting the commercial sales 
and usage of marijuana within the Southern Netherlands on drug crimes. There is currently a 
limited amount of literature on the effectiveness of drug policies. Prior literature on Dutch drug 
policies, qualitative in nature and limited in scope, found that there was an increase in illicit drug 
activity within specific municipalities and noted a significant decrease in drug tourism after 
introduction. Therefore, this study seeks to answer the question on whether the revision and 
implementation of the 2012 drug policy within the three Southern provinces of Limburg, Noord-
Brabant, and Zeeland had a significant impact on the drug crimes within those municipalities.  
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The data used for this paper comes from the Dutch Statistics Bureau in the form its public 
Statline database which provides the crime data on municipal level with various socio-economic 
characteristics of municipalities located within the Netherlands. Using balanced panel data with 
data from 2009 to 2014, propensity score matching was used to create a counterfactual group and 
using difference-in-differences to assess the impact while controlling for municipality- and time 
fixed effects. Findings reveal that the implementation of the policy led to reduction in the 
magnitude of the reported coefficient for soft- and hard drugs, these results were not reported as 
significant. However, implementing a placebo test by delaying the period of implementation by 
one year reported that the policy did significantly affect the soft- and hard drug crime rate which 
may be due to the fact that during the initial implementation of the policy led to a sharp increase 
in committed drug crimes as a response due to the legal channel of purchasing marijuana being 
disrupted, leading to an expansion of the illicit drug market activity within the border regions of 
The Netherlands. 
The contribution of this paper is that the empirical evidence indicates that the restricting 
the commercial sales to municipal residents in an effort to combat drug tourism does not lead a 
significant increase in illicit crime even though there was a short increase in illicit drug crime 
during its implementation. In addition, findings reveal that this type of policy, while reducing 
drug tourism does not statistically affect local firm revenue. Thus, the policy has had an overall 
beneficial effect without significantly increasing illicit drug activity nor affecting the local 
economy within Southern coffee shop municipalities. Additionally, this is the first study on this 
topic that uses propensity score matching with difference-in-differences, to assess the impact of 
addressing drug tourism within the Southern Netherlands thereby controlling for the possibility 
of observed and unobserved heterogeneity. 
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The paper is structured as follows. The next section contains a short review on the on-
going debate and literature between drug prohibition and liberalization followed by an overview 
of prior and existing situation within the Netherlands regarding drugs, drug policies and the 
economic role of marijuana. The third section presents the methodology used for estimating the 
possible impact on drug crimes and the performance on the local economy as a result of 
implementing the revised drug policy within coffee shop municipalities. The fourth section 
provides an overview of the data sources used for the results and how the data set was 
constructed. The fourth section presents the main results including robustness checks, and the 
fifth section contains the conclusion.  
 
Background 
One of the early pioneers of adopting decriminalization policies on drug usage was the 
Netherlands in the early 1970s. However, like many neighboring countries at the time, it 
maintained a policy focused on prohibition on the basis of sources that alluded that marijuana 
usage would result in physical and psychological issues for users and thus presented a significant 
danger for society at large. The continued difficulty of governmental institutions in dealing with 
drug usage within society eventually led to the Dutch government in appointed the Hulsman 
commission in 1968 and the Baan commission in 1972 to analyze the issue of drugs within 
society and how to best deal with the increasing problem.  
Based on the works of Cohen (1975), the Commissions’ recommendation was to create 
and enforce a policy based on decriminalization of drugs and toleration of usage within a set of 
limitations referred to in modern literature as the “Dutch model”.  The main emphasis of this 
model was on harm reduction and ensuring continuation of public order, health, and safety of the 
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general public but also drug users. By adopting a harm reduction model in combination with 
decriminalizing the purchasing, possession, and cultivation of marijuana for personal usage, law 
enforcement would alter its target to combatting large-scale illicit drug dealing and growing 
operations within the Netherlands.  
With increases in international tourism and the normalization of attitudes towards drugs 
and drug usage within society, especially within the Western hemisphere in the early 2000s, the 
coffee shop industry provided a lucrative revenue stream for the government. Earlier estimates 
by the research institute Intraval in 2013 on the coffee shop industry found that coffee shops had 
a revenue approximately between 875 million and 1.25 billion euros based on a sample of 30 
coffee shop establishments. An assessment by OWP Research (2008) on the benefit of the coffee 
shop industry within the Southern municipality of Maastricht in Limburg found that the 
expenditure of coffee shop visitors resulted in a benefit of 78 million euros for the retail industry 
and 37 million euros for the hospitality industry and an employment benefit of 1,617 FTEs of 
which 958 retail industry and 608 in the hospitality industry. Recent studies such as on the 
marijuana industry in the United States show similar benefits for municipalities that legalized the 
purchase of recreational marijuana such as Henchmann (2014) and Henchmann and Scarboro 
(2016). The rise of drug tourism, though economically beneficial overall, it came with various 
negative externalities within coffee shop municipalities, especially considering the legal, 
medical, and safety risks for drug tourists. Earlier studies have linked that drug tourists have 
significantly linked with nuisance (Bieleman, Mennes, and Sijtsma, 2017) 
In a report by the Dutch government in 1995, it detailed three aspects that required action 
which was the problem of nuisance associated with not only hard drug users but also 
increasingly soft drug users and the coffee shops, the increase of large-scale illicit drug activity 
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by organized crime within the Netherlands, and the role of drug tourism within and outside the 
Netherlands. Therefore, while the main focus of the policy would remain unchanged, the 
limitations set by policy makers for drug users and coffee shops would be expanded through the 
addition of the AHOJ-G criteria on the national level which prohibited drug advertisements (A), 
the sales of hard drugs as defined by the Opium Act (H), to cause public disorder or nuisance 
associated with drugs (O), that minors could not enter coffee shops nor be sold soft drugs (J), 
that no more than 5 grams of marijuana per transaction would be sold to customers, and that 
coffee shops would have a limit of a maximum inventory of 500 grams of marijuana (G). Though 
the AHOJ-G criteria was a start in further defining the Dutch model in addressing the three key 
issues raised by the Baan commission, the lack of a regulatory framework on the back-end 
operations of coffee shops facilitated the continued operations of illicit marijuana cultivation by 
organized crime to meet market demand.  
Though the impact on public order and local residents is well understood at this point, 
few studies have been conducted on the negative impact of drug tourism on local economies, 
prior studies such as Snippe, Naayer, and Bieleman (2006) and van der Torre, Cachet, and Dijk, 
(2008) provide an indication as both studies focus this exact relationship by examining firms 
located within coffee shop municipalities within border regions attributed with high degrees of 
drug tourism. Snippe, Naayer, and Bieleman (2006) focused on the border town of Venlo in the 
province of Limburg adjacent to Germany and experiences a large degree of drug tourists. In 
their research, they compared the financial performance in qualitative survey between 1999 and 
2003 and found that firms located within a high degree of drug tourism reported lower revenue 
(57 percentage points to 33 percentage points) in comparison to those in no or low degree areas 
(34 percentage points to 25 percentage points). Van der Torre et al. (2008) focused on the 
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municipalities of Roosendaal and Bergen op Zoom in the province of Noord-Brabant adjacent to 
Belgium and found similar evidence of reduced retail revenue of firms located with a high 
concentration of drug tourism when compared to firms in no or low concentration districts.  
In 2009, the government appointed Van de Donk commission presented its findings on 
what measures should be taken on addressing the issue of the illicit domestic and international 
drug production and trade, the lack of a regulatory framework on the back-end of coffee shops, 
and the ever-increasing presence of drug tourism and its associated negative aspects.  
The recommendation of the Van de Donk commission on reducing drug tourism was to 
create a closed membership system for coffee shops to limit drug tourists from purchasing 
marijuana within the Netherlands (van de Donk et al., 2009). However, the report noted that such 
a system would result in a sharp increase in illegal street dealing of drugs and local nuisance 
respectively. Regardless of the stated issues of implementing the closed membership system, the 
then Justice minister, Ivo Opstelten, announced that the government was seeking to implement 
two additional criteria in 2012 to the existing AHOG-J criterion, namely the closed membership 
system (B) and local municipal sales restriction (I) for coffee shops located within the Southern 
provinces of Limburg, North-Brabant, and Zeeland as a trial to assess the effectiveness of the 
policy and, if successful, expand the policy nationwide (TK, 2011) 
The initial response from various stakeholders was anything but positive as the proposal 
was rejected by parliament and led to the creation of an alternative proposal which sought to 
implement the policy of restricting sales to non-residents as a trial but limited in scope by 
seeking a trial area to assess the feasibility and impact of the policy and dropping the 
requirement for a closed-membership system for coffee shop municipalities.. The trial would 
start 2012, the AHOJ-G criterion would be expanded in the three Southern provinces by adding 
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the restriction that coffee shops could not sell marijuana to non-municipal residents or risk fines, 
a temporary suspension of their commercial license, or a permanent closure of the coffee shop. 
Since then, several studies were conducted on the initial effect of the policy in treated areas.  
Van Ooyen-Houben, Bieleman, and Korf (2014) conducted a qualitative survey within 
five coffee shop municipalities of which three were located within the three Southern provinces. 
The findings revealed that the policy implementation was quickly followed by an increase in 
nuisance, drug activity, and reduction in feeling safe in their neighborhood. Nabben, Wouters, 
Benschop, and Korf (2015) followed up on this research by expanding the sample size to 31 
coffee shop municipalities across 11 provinces and in addition examining the impact on the 
municipal crime rate. As a result of restricting sales to non-residents, Nabben et al. (2015) found 
that there was an overall increase in illicit drug activity, especially in coffee shop municipalities 
located within border regions in comparison.  
Review of existing studies on the topic of drug tourism and the illicit black markets 
portrays the following knowledge gap. Prior studies are qualitative in nature and do not 
encompass all coffee shop municipalities that implemented the I criterion in 2012. While the 
research results from these studies capture the effect of the policy in specific municipalities that 
experience a high degree of drug tourism, these studies do not account for heterogeneity, do not 
control for differences between coffee shop municipalities, and have more limited sample set. 
This study seeks to add to the existing body of literature by analyzing the policy impact on all 
coffee shop municipalities at the time of implementation but also two years after implementation.  
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Methodology 
The aim of this paper is to estimate the impact of the implementing the 2012 revised drug 
policy on the registered municipal drug crime rate and the revenue performance of firms located 
within Southern coffee shop located in the Netherlands.  
I used propensity score matching (abbrev. PSM) in constructing a control group that is 
not statistically different from the treatment group on the basis of their observed characteristics, 
in combination with a linear difference-in-differences model (abbrev. DD) with a binary dummy 
variable for drug policies with firm-, municipal and year fixed effects to assess the change in the 
national drug policy on the municipal crime rate and firm performance using the following 
standard DD specification:  
 
ݕ௜௧ = ߙ + ߜܦ௜ × ݀௧ + ߤ௜ + ߣ௧ +  ߱௜ + ߳௜௧, (1) 
 
where ݕ௜௧ is the output of interest of coffee shop municipality or firm i in year t, ߙ is the 
constant, D denotes the treatment variable which is equal to 1 when a coffee shop municipality is 
covered by the 2012 revised drug policy and 0 if the municipality was not mandated to 
implement it in 2012, d is the interaction term for the time period which is equal to 1 for year 
2012 and afterwards and 0 for years prior to 2012, ߤ௜ and ߣ௧ capture the municipality- and time 
fixed effect which controls for municipality- and time-variant and invariant characteristics for 
coffee shop municipalities, ߱௜ introduces linear time trend to control for macro-economic effects, 
and ߳௜ is the error term. The parameter of interest for the DD model in equation 1 is ߜ which 
captures the average impact of the intervention on the outcome of interest of the treatment group.   
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For the DD model, an important component that validates the results of the DD model is 
the parallel trend assumption which states the trend of the dependable variable of the control- 
and treatment group is statistically significant different as this would lead to a biased estimator. 
In order to verify the parallel trend assumption, I follow the recommendation of Autor (2003)and 
estimate the parallel trend assumption through the following specification: 
 
ݕ௜௧ = ෍ܤ௞ଶ
௞ୀଵ
ܦ௜ × ݀௧ା௞ + ෍ܤି௞ܦ௜ଶ
௞ୀ଴
× ݀௧ି௞ + ߤ௜ + ߣ௧ + ߱௜ + ߳௜௧, (2) 
 
where ܦ௜ × ݀௧ା௞ represents the interaction terms capturing the variable of interest of 
coffee shop municipalities in the pre-treatment period (2009-2011), ܦ௜ × ݀௧ି௞  represents the 
interaction dummies of the outcome of interest in the post-treatment period (2012-2014), and ߤ௜ 
plus ߣ௧ capture the municipality and time-fixed effects, and ߱௜ introduces a linear time trend as 
explained in equation 1. The importance of equation 2 is two-fold. First, it provides a year by 
year change of the coefficient of the dependent variable and to assess whether the initial impact 
of the intervention, which in this case is the revision to the drug policy, and the increase or 
decrease in the magnitude of the coefficient over time. Second, in order to verify that the DD 
model satisfies the necessary assumptions of a parallel trend between the control- and treatment 
group, the trend of the dependable variable of both groups in the pre-treatment period can be 
compared. If the outcome variable in the pre-treatment period, represented by the lead dummies, 
is reported as statistically significant, then this would indicate that the pre-treatment trend is 
different between the treatment- and control group and thus the reported outcome in the post-
treatment period would be considered biased. As a robustness check for the DD model, the main 
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analysis was repeated with a lead and lagged treatment indicator where the revision to the drug 
policy was implemented two years earlier (2010) and one year later (2013) as a placebo test. In 
the case of the lead treatment indicator being reported as statistically significant, this would 
provide an indication that the reaction to the drug policy was predated and if the lagged treatment 
indicator is reported as significant, it is possible that the policy had a delayed effect on the 
outcome of interest.  
In order to control for the possibility of statistical difference between the observed 
differences between the treatment- and control group in the DD model, I use propensity score 
matching in the pre-treatment period to create a control group that consists out of coffee shop 
municipalities that is similar to coffee shop municipalities in the treatment group on the basis of 
their observable characteristics. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) propose a statistical matching 
technique referred to as propensity score matching (henceforth abbreviated as PSM) to overcome 
the issue associated with a high dimensional vector. The PSM technique uses a single index 
named the propensity score which 47 captures the probability of an observation to be selected for 
treatment based on their observed characteristics. Let the ܲ(ܺ௜) be the propensity score which is 
defined as ܲ( ௜ܺ)  =  ܲ(ܦ௜ |ܺ௜). The validity of the PSM technique relies on two assumptions.  
The first assumption is the conditional independence assumption which is expressed as 
ݕ௜଴,ݕ௜ଵ  ∐ܦ௜ |ܺ௜ where ∐ indicates that the treatment assignment is independent of the outcome 
variable of interest and solely based on the set of observed characteristics. Fulfilling the 
conditional independence assumption eliminates the bias attributed due to differences in the 
observable characteristics between treated- and control coffee shop municipalities. The second 
assumption is the common overlap which states that coffee shop municipalities with a similar X 
values have an equal probability of being both treated and control coffee shop municipalities 
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which is necessary to form valid counterfactuals for treated observations. The propensity score is 
estimated with either a probit- or logit model using a set of observed characteristics before the 
start of the treatment and then matches treated- and control coffee shop municipalities on the 
proximity of their propensity score.  
The main matching method used for creating the control group is the nearest-neighbor 
matching (NNM) algorithm. The NNM method compares treatment observations with control 
firms with the nearest propensity score. The NNM method always varying degree of options of 
altering the matching procedure. In the case of this study, the number of neighbors were set to 
the nearest two, four, and six and included a caliper that consisted of 25% of the standard 
deviation of the logit model as advised by Austin (2011). The caliper will limit the range of the 
propensity score and thus prevent matches that beyond a specified range and improve the 
matching quality. Lastly, the NMM matching model can also be used with the option of common 
support between treatment- and control observations. Should common support not be used within 
a matching specification, it will lead to matches whose propensity score are distant from one 
another and may not prove to be a viable match. To improve matching quality, this study used 
common support with nearest-neighbor and kernel matching. 
There are several methods to determine the quality of the matching model afterwards. 
First is to check the bias of the chosen variables between the treatment- and control group in the 
pre- and post-policy period. Literature on this topic such as Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), 
Sianesi (2004) and Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) argue that the bias should be reduced to or 
below 5% under a strong ignorability assumption and 10% for weak ignorability.  
The second method is to verify whether a variable is significantly different when 
compared between the treatment- and control group as the matching procedure should in theory 
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have balanced both groups and eliminate significant differences between the two. Secondary 
check would be to verify if a similar matching result can be replicated using an alternative 
matching algorithm. 
The third method follows the recommendation of Sianesi (2004) by checking the joint 
significance and Pseudo-R2 before and after the matching procedure. The joint significant test 
should be reported as insignificant and the Psuedo-R2 should report a lower value after matching 
due to significant differences. Fourth is to compare the common overlap between the treatment- 
and control group by checking the mean difference in the outcome variable and the density of the 
propensity scores given to observations within each propensity block.  
The last method is to apply the Rosenbaum Bounds by Rosenbaum et al. (2002) which 
assesses the sensitivity of a matching specification. According to Rosenbaum et al. (2002), 
Gangl, (2004) and Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), it is important to check whether the 
probability of the treatment assignment is vulnerable and can be altered by unobservable factors. 
Let ߨ௜ be the treatment assignment, ܺ௜ be the set of observed characteristics, Γ is the effect of 
unobserved characteristics on the treatment assignment probability, and let ݑ௜ be the unobserved 
component in the following specification:  
ߨ௜ = Pr (ܦ௜ = 1|ܺ௜ = ܨ(ߚܺ + ݅ + Γݑ௜) (3) 
 
which states that the probability of treatment assignment is determined by observed and 
unobserved characteristics. Parameter Γ captures the effect of the unobserved characteristics on 
the probability that coffee shop municipalities are selected as either treated- or control 
observations. If there is no unobservable bias influencing the probability, then Γ would be zero 
and ߨ௜  =  ܲ ݎ(ܦ௜  =  1| ௜ܺ) is solely determined by the observed characteristics. Existing 
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literature often cited on the issues is Duvendack and Palmer-Jones (2012) who state that in the 
case of the social sciences, a Γ value of 2.0 would indicate strong insensitivity to unobserved 
characteristics influencing the probability of treatment assignment. 
 
Data 
The empirical analysis is based on the combination of two separate data sources 
containing a wealth of information collected and maintained by the Dutch Statistics Bureau. The 
first data source, Statline, is a publicly accessible database and gathers information on the 
Netherlands through government institutions and other stakeholders and thus the databank 
contains a range of national, provincial, and municipal statistics. The dependable variables of 
interest chosen for this study are the number of registered soft and hard drugs within 
municipalities and a range of variables such as population density, employment- and 
unemployment rate, number of registered students, mean household income, mean real-estate 
value, industry- and coffee shop density within a municipality. These set of characteristics are 
used during propensity matching to construct a counterfactual group of coffee shop 
municipalities that closely resemble the coffee shop municipalities required to implement the 
policy in 2012. Two unique filters were used to limit the control- and treatment group 
observations. First,  a dummy variable was created that would identify municipalities that had a 
coffee shop establishment within their domain by using the coffee shop industry information 
provided by Bieleman et al. (2017) where a coffee shop municipality would be equal to one and 
zero otherwise. Municipalities that were categorized as “Non-coffee shop municipalities” were 
dropped from the sample set. Second, the creation of another dummy variable with the purpose 
of identifying which of these coffee shop municipalities had a coffee shop before the 
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implementation of the policy of 2012 and had remained coffee shop municipalities after 2012 
again based on information provided in the annual coffee shop report by Bieleman et al. (2017). 
Coffee shop municipalities that had closed coffee shops within their domain before 2012 and 
remained closed were dropped from the sample set. Finally, coffee shop municipalities with 
missing crime or socio-economic data were dropped from the sample resulting in balanced data 
set with 20 coffee shop municipalities in the treatment group and 83 number in the control group 
with a total of 618 municipal observations over six-year period from 2009 to 2014.  
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of treated- and control coffee shop 
municipalities in the pre-treatment period. Column 1 and 2 present the mean values of a set of 
dependent and independable variables divided in crime and municipal socio-economic 
characteristics. Column 3 reports the mean difference of coffee shop municipalities in the 
treatment- and control group. Examining the reported values in Column 3, an important note is 
that the number of committed soft drug crimes is more numerous in the treatment group and the 
difference between the two is reported as statistically significant. This provides evidence on the 
rationality on why governmental institutes implemented the trial policy within the three border 
regions as the descriptive statistics show that there is a larger presence of drug tourism when 
compared to other regions.  
One possible explanation is the geographical proximity of the coffee shop municipalities 
in the three border regions to neighboring countries such as Belgium and Germany as can be 
seen in Figure 1. The addition of high-quality road and train infrastructure between neighboring 
countries allows drug tourists to easily visit these border regions in comparison to those further 
North. However, the same is not reported when examining the hard drug crime rate.  
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Comparing the municipal socio-economic characteristics, the difference in the mean 
value of coffee shop municipalities in the treatment- and control group is negligible and not 
reported as statistically significant which indicates that municipalities that allow for the 
commercial sales of marijuana are quite similar. However, it is important to indicate that even 
though there are more committed drug crimes in treated coffee shop municipalities, the density 
of coffee shops is higher in the control group even though the difference is not reported as being 
statistically different.  
 
Results 
Based on the descriptive statistics presented in the previous section, there is a significant 
mean difference between the treated- and control coffee shop municipalities when looking at the 
outcome of interest, namely the soft drug crime rate. To verify whether PSM is required for this 
study is to check the results of the DD model without prior matching between the treatment- and 
control group which are presented in Table 2 and Table 3 for the yearly change in the DD 
coefficient. Table 2 shows the DD model as specified in equation 1 and shows that the policy had 
a statistically significant impact on the soft drug crimes but not on hard drugs when controlling 
for municipality- and time fixed effects.  
To verify whether the DD model without prior matching can be considered robust, 
equation 2 to show the yearly change in the coefficient is examined in Table 3. The interaction 
terms for the pre-treatment years of 2009 and 2010 are both reported as being statistically 
significant indicating that results of the DD model are biased as there is no parallel trend between 
the treatment- and control group. One method in controlling for this issue to create a control 
group that more specifically matched the treatment group on a select set of covariates.  
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The control for the main analysis was created using the nearest-neighbor matching 
algorithm with up to four neighbors and a caliper of 25% of the standard deviation.1 The set of 
covariates chosen for the propensity score specification is the degree of poverty, median 
household income, average real-estate value, density of café and other establishments within a 5 
kilometer radius, number of employed residents, the number of university graduates, the coffee 
shop density and the percentage change in the number of arrests made on municipal level.  
Table 4, Table 5, and Table 6 provide information on the success of the matching 
procedure of balancing the covariates between the treatment- and control group. Table 4 reports 
an overview of the treatment- and control group before and after matching. Columns 1 and 2 list 
the mean values of the treatment and control group respectively. The difference between both 
groups differs on the chosen covariate. Column 3 shows the percentage difference between both 
groups where the percentage difference for most covariates is above 10% such as poverty, 
household income, café density, university graduates, coffee shop density, and the change in 
arrested suspects. However, when examining the percentage difference after matching in column 
6, there is a large reduction in the mean values of the treatment- and control with the majority of 
covariates being under 10% and a few under 5% indicating that the matching procedure resulted 
in better fit at the expense of losing two treatment observations due to being “off support” due to 
the caliper being included.  
The remainder of the statistics are presented in Table 5. Following the recommendation 
of Sianesi (2004) as detailed prior, the Pseudo R2 in column 1 has decreased significantly after 
matching (0.198 to 0.011) indicating that the matching procedure resulted in observations in both 
 
 
1 Propensity score matching procedure was completed using the Stata module -psmatch2- by M. 
Leuven and Sianesi (2003) 
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groups to have similar characteristics. Column 2 the test of joint significance and is reported as 
insignificant when compared before matching (0.013) and after matching (1.000) further 
validating the quality of the control group. Columns 3 presents the absolute bias which according 
to literature should be lower than 25 and this match resulted in an absolute bias of 24.4 which 
can be seen as relatively high. Table 6 presents the results of using kernel matching and nearest-
neighbor matching with a different degree of neighbors. Comparing the before (U) and after (M) 
matched statistics, it is evident that the matching specification can be considered robust as all 
statistics are within specified parameters. 
Another test of robustness is to check the sensitivity of the matching specification 
through the Rosenbaum Bounds. Table 7 presents the Rosenbaum bounds for NNM up to four 
neighbors matching specification.2 Column 1 shows the unit increase of Γ starting at 1 up to 2. 
The sensitivity of the matching specification can be assessed by checking at which unit of Γ the 
significance level, shown in column 2, becomes insignificant using the Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test. The unit increase did not lead to a significance of 0.05 prior to 2 indicating that the 
unobserved variable of Γ would have to increase with more than 200% before the matching 
specification would become sensitive to a form of hidden bias. On the basis of this, it can be 
argued that the matching specification is insensitive to the possibility of hidden bias.  
The last test is to verify whether there is evidence of common support between the 
treatment- and control group using visual representation. Figure 1 shows the propensity score 
density on the y-axis and propensity score on the x-axis before matching (left) and after 
matching (right). On the basis of Figure 1, there is a significant increase in the overlap between 
 
 
2 Stata module -rbounds- by Gangl (2004)was used for assessing the Rosenbaum bounds for the 
propensity score matching specification.  
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the treatment- and control after matching. While the control group lacks a certain amount of 
overlap at specific propensity score blocks (.04 - .06), the visual representation indicates that 
there is significant overlap which further validates the matching procedure. Having completed 
the matching specification, the main analysis will first present the policy’s impact on drug crimes 
followed by examining the impact on firms. The robustness checks have established that the 
construction of the control group passes various requirements as seen in existing literature.  
Table 8 presents the impact on hard- and soft drugs using the DD model on municipal 
level while controlling for municipality-, time-, and adding a linear time trend. Columns 1 and 2 
present the impact on soft drugs and the interaction term of the DD model reports no statistical 
significance indicating that the implementation of the policy in 2012 and continued enforcement 
up to 2014. Similar result is reported in Columns 3 and 4 when examining the impact on hard 
drugs. These two results would indicate that the coffee shop municipalities in the treatment group 
did not see a statistical effect in comparison to control coffee shop municipalities. Though prior 
literature mentions that illicit drug activity did increase in the beginning but states that this 
phenomenon was not wide-spread or large enough to cause statistical difference.  
Table 9 presents the yearly change in the DD estimator to assess not only the validity of 
the DD model as done previously but also to check whether any specific year during or after the 
implementation of the policy is reported as significant. Columns 1 and 2 present the soft drug 
crime and report no significance for the years 2009 up to 2014. However, when comparing the 
DD coefficient for 2011 and 2013 in column 1, there is a strong decrease in the reported 
magnitude from -.17.08 to -5.43 verifying the mention of rising illicit drug activity referenced in 
existing literature but returning back to pre-policy levels in 2014 most likely due to a set of 
factors such as increased police presence and / or enforcement or the lack of market demand due 
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to the reduction in drug tourism. Column 2 presents the soft drug crimes with the addition of 
introducing a linear time trend. The coefficient in column 2 present a similar pattern as seen in 
column 1 in the pre-policy period for 2010 and 2011, the magnitude turns positive in the year of 
implementation (-9.22 to 6.35) indicating that there may have been an initial increase in illicit 
drug activity. However, the coefficient in 2012 is reported as statistically significant with 
negative magnitude (-7.35) possibly indicating that the policy has a lagged treatment effect.   
The results of the PSM-DD model present the fact that the policy did not lead to a 
increase reported as statistically significant when examining either hard- or soft drug crimes after 
controlling for municipal- and time fixed effects. However, when examining the reduction in 
magnitude by checking the lead and lag indicators as seen in Table X, there is the possibility that 
the policy has a delayed effect after implementation in treated coffee shop municipalities.   
As presented in the methodology of this paper, two alternative placebo tests are used to 
determine whether or not there is a form of precipitation before the policy is implemented or a 
delay of the policy having an effect. Table 10 shows the lead- and lag placebo and reveals that 
there is statistical significance when delaying treatment by one year indicating that the policy had 
a lagged effect after implementation when comparing it to estimations presented in Table 8 
which were reported as statistically insignificant.  
An alternative explanation for the discrepancy in significance between Table 8 and Table 
10 can be that the short-term increase in the number of committed drug crimes, as seen in Figure 
3 which portrays the yearly committed soft drug crimes, shows a sharp increase between 2011 
and 2012 for coffee shop municipalities in the three Southern provinces of Limburg, Noord-
Brabant, and Zeeland.  
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The main results of this study thus show that on an overall level, the I criterion, which 
was introduced into the drug policy for Dutch coffee shop municipalities in three border regions 
resulted in a decrease in committed drug crimes when compared to a control group constructed 
using propensity score matching on the basis of a set of chosen covariates similar to the 
treatment group.  
Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to analyze the impact of the changes in 2012 to the Dutch 
drug policy on crime within Dutch coffee shop municipalities and whether firms located within 
these coffee shop municipalities were significantly affected after a significant reduction in drug 
tourism based on prior qualitative studies. Using data from the Statline and Microdata databanks 
for the period between 2009 to 2014 while employing propensity score matching with difference-
in-differences to estimate the impact on variables of interest, namely drug crimes and firm 
revenue. The matching procedure balanced the coffee shop municipalities in the treatment- and 
control group on a various set of municipal characteristics and, in the case of the firm data, on a 
set of financial ratios. Nearest-neighbor and Kernel matching were used to create the control 
group and matching quality was considered to be sufficient based on recommendations from 
existing literature.  
The findings of the difference-in-difference model revealed that the policy did not cause a 
statistically significant impact on hard- and soft drug crimes of treated coffee shop municipalities 
after controlling for municipal- and time fixed effects with and without a linear time trend. 
However, considering the negative magnitude of the DD coefficient, the occurrence of drug 
crimes is still higher within matched coffee shop municipalities. Examining the yearly change by 
using year dummies proved that the DD model was robust as the DD coefficients in the pre-
THE DUTCH ANSWER TO DRUG TOURISM WITHIN DUTCH MUNICIPALITIES 23 
treatment were not reported as significant and using alternative starting years for treatment as a 
placebo further revealed that there is the possibility of a lagged treatment effect.   
Therefore, the evidence presented in this paper seems to conclude that the introduction of 
the I criteria in the AHOJ-G criterion for coffee shop municipalities in the border provinces of 
Limburg, Noord-Brabant, and Zeeland did not cause a discernable increase in the number of 
registered drug crimes and led to a reduction in drug tourists visiting coffee shops located in 
municipalities that implemented the new criterion in 2012.  
There are some limitations of this study that should be addressed. The first limitation is 
the limited range of years analyzed in this study from 2009 to 2014. While data before 2009 is 
available, several municipalities prior to 2009 held corroborative police projects that were 
designed in reducing the negative issues of drug tourism through increased police presence, and 
temporary closure of coffee shops within their municipal domain. Second, while the national law 
mandated that municipalities within the chosen three provinces had to implement and enforce 
this policy in 2012, municipalities were given autonomy in enforcing the policy. Several of these 
municipalities chose not to continue enforcement activities and others re-aligned enforcement to 
a lower priority. However, no exact data is available to control for this issue which led to the 
study merely focusing from 2009 to 2014. The second limitation of note is the narrow scope of 
this research project as it focuses primarily on committed drug crimes within coffee shop 
municipalities.  
Future research on this topic is promising with the recent change in the perspective of 
using marijuana for medicinal purposes or for recreational usage in society, especially within the 
United States of America that has since the early 1950s been the driving force behind drug 
prohibition policies around the world. The most important gap within existing literature with 
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regard to this policy is the lack of a more comprehensive research study that examines the impact 
of the policy on the local economy, especially on firms that benefit greatly from tourism such as 
the retail-, hospitality-, and accommodation industries. Prior studies have primarily qualitative in 
nature and focused on crime and the change in attitude of residents that live in close proximity or 
in an area with a high degree of tourism. With the rapid legalization of full recreational 
marijuana in Washington, Colorado, and Illinois, these areas will undoubtably experience the 
positives and negatives of drug tourism. Policy makers within these local governmental 
institutions would be able to reference this and future studies on what policy to implement with 
the purpose of addressing drug tourism. 
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Appendix 
Definition of variables 
Statline Databank 
Variables Definition 
GEMCODE Municipality code given by the Dutch Statistics Bureau  
POLICY Dummy variable to indicate whether the municipality implemented 
the 2012 I criteria 
TIME Dummy variable to indicate the pre- and post-treatment period 
EMPLOYMENT The number of residents within a municipality that at a minimum has 
a part-time or full-time employment 
UNEMPLOYMENT The number of residents within a municipality that receive 
unemployment benefits from the Dutch UWV  
POVERTY 
 
The number of residents within a municipality whose income is 
below or near poverty level and receive a welfare subsidy from the 
UWV 
REALESTATE The average value of housing real-estate located within a 
municipality 
SOFTDRUGS The number of registered crimes that fall under the soft drug category 
as framed by the Opium Act of 1970 
HARDDRUGS The number of registered crimes that fall under the hard drug 
category as framed by the Opium Act of 1970 
NUISANCE The number of crimes that are classified as nuisance under criminal 
code 50 of the Dutch justice system 
SUSPECTS The number of criminal suspects arrested within a municipality 
HHINCOME The median income of households within a municipality 
COFFEESHOP The number of coffee shops located within a municipality based on 
the industry reports published by the Intraval institute 
HOSPITALITY 
DENSITY 
The density of cafes, restaurants, and hotels within a five-kilometer 
radius from residents that are located within a municipality 
STUDENTS The number of students that are registered as in either belonging to a 
vocational or university based on their residential address 
GRADUATES The number of students that graduated from vocational or university 
according to their residential address 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of treated- and control coffee shop municipalities pre-treatment period 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Coffee shop municipalities 
Mean difference Standard error 
Variable 
Treated Control   
Crime characteristics 
Soft drugs 96.13 50.54 -45.58* 20.15 
Hard drugs 56.88 62.71 5.84 39.63 
Suspects 2775.50 2981.20 205.70 1264.72 
     
Municipality characteristics 
Poverty 2560.25 2981.20 550.49 1264.72 
Household 
income 27.09 27.96 0.87 0.76 
Real-estate value 8773.75 9182.64 408.89 3117.42 
Café density 
(5km) 26.49 35.30 8.82 14.85 
Employment 52.77 51.05 -1.72 18.51 
University 
graduates 218.43 292.85 74.43 183.27 
Coffee shop 
density 4.40 6.99 2.59 5.68 
Observations 20 83   
Note:  ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01 
 Household income and real-estate value are reported in €1,000 
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Table 2 
The impact of the policy on soft- and hard drug crimes of coffee shop municipalities before 
propensity score matching 
Policy ≥ 2012 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Soft drug crimes Hard drug crimes 
Coffee shop municipalities  
× Policy2009_2014 
-26.14* -6.17 -6.01 -0.74 
(8.40) (6.81) (5.68) (6.99) 
Municipal fixed effects Yes Yes Ye Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Linear fixed effects No Yes No Yes 
Observations 618 618 618 618 
R2 0.077 0.501 0.028 0.385 
Note:  ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01 
DD coefficient is captured by (ܦ௜  × ݀௧) in equation 1 
Clustered standard errors are grouped on municipal level and reported in 
parenthesis.  
Source: Statline databank 
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Table 3 
The impact of the policy on soft- and hard drug crimes of coffee shop municipalities before 
propensity score matching 
Policy ≥ 2012 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Soft drug crimes Hard drug crimes 
Policy Implementation  
– 2 Years 
-12.63* -5.27 0.96 2.46 
(-4.97) (4.85) (7.42) (7.34) 
Policy Implementation  
– 1 Years 
-30.37** -15.66* -5.76 -2.77 
(9.73) (7.78) (9.37) (8.55) 
Policy Implementation -17.23 4.83 0.80 5.30 (10.07) (6.79) (7.52) (6.41) 
Policy Implementation  
+ 1 Year 
-38.34** -9.43* -7.36 -1.38 
(10.84) (3.78) (10.68) (6.18) 
Policy Implementation  
+ 2 Years 
-43.37** -6.61 -9.80 -2.31 
(12.82) (3.95) (9.49) (2.83) 
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Linear time trend No Yes No Yes 
Observations 618 618 618 618 
R2 0.107 0.524 0.030 0.388 
Note:  ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01 
DD coefficient is captured by (ܦ௜  × ݀௧) in equation 2 
Clustered standard errors are grouped on municipal level and reported in 
parenthesis.  
Source: Statline databank 
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Table 5 
Propensity score statistics before and after matching in the pre-policy period 
  
  
 Pseudo R2 LRꭓ2 p > ꭓ2 Rubin’s B 
Unmatched 0.198 19.29 0.013 62.3* 
Matched 0.011 0.56 1.000 24.4 
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Table 6 
Propensity score statistics of alternative matching algorithms and specifications before and after 
matching in the pre-policy period 
Unmatched versus Matched statistics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Kernel matching Nearest-
neighbor (2NN) 
Nearest-neighbor 
(4NN) 
Nearest-
neighbor (6NN) 
U M U M U M U M 
Pseudo R2  0.198 0.003 0.198 0.068 0.198 0.011 0.198 0.007 
LRꭓ2  19.95 0.14 19.29 3.41 19.29 0.56 19.29 0.34 
p > ꭓ2  1.000 0.011 0.013 0.906 0.013 1.000 0.013 1.000 
Mean bias  21.9 2.5 21.7 8.2 21.7 4.6 21.7 2.3 
Median bias  13.1 2.1 13.1 8.9 13.1 4.7 13.1 1.6 
Rubin’s B  62.7* 12.2 62.3* 59.0* 62.3* 24.4 62.3* 18.9* 
Note:  Nearest-neighbor and kernel matching is based on a logit model 
Caliper used in the PSM specification is 25% of the standard deviation 
Source: Statline databank 
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Table 7 
Rosenbaum bounds to check for sensitivity in the propensity score matching specification in the 
pre-policy period 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  
Gamma (Γ) Significance 
levels 
 Hodges-
Lehmann 
 95% 
Confidence 
intervals 
 
 Sig- Sig+ T-hat- T-hat+ CI- CI+ 
1 .001146 .001146 54.375   54.375 22.5 129.375 
1.1 .002017 .000618 45 57.5 21.25 132.5 
1.2 .003242 .000334 42.5 63.75 19.375 135 
1.3 .004857 .000181 42.5 72.5 16.875 140 
1.4 .006884 .000099 41.25 75 11.25 150 
1.5 .009332 .000054    40 77.5 8.75 158.75 
1.6 .012200 .000029 38.75 88.125 5 171.875 
1.7 .015477   .000016 38.125 91.25 3.75 177.5 
1.8 .019146 8.8e-06 37.5 93.75 2.5 190 
1.9 .023187 4.8e-06 37.5 101.25 1.875 190 
2.0 .027577 2.7e-06 36.25 106.25 -1.25 192.5 
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Table 8 
The impact of the policy on soft- and hard drug crimes after propensity score matching 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Soft drug crimes Hard drug crimes 
Coffee shop municipalities  
× Policy2009_2014 
-13.80 0.39 -8.85 2.67 
(9.18) (5.99) (4.50) (5.48) 
Municipal fixed effects Yes Yes Ye Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Linear time trend No Yes No Yes 
Observations 312 312 312 312 
R2 0.164 0.620 0.084 0.402 
Note:  ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01 
DD coefficient is captured by (ܦ௜  × ݀௧) in equation 1 
Clustered standard errors are grouped on municipal level and reported in 
parenthesis.  
Source: Statline databank 
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Table 9 
The yearly change in the DD estimator after propensity score matching 
Policy ≥ 2012 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Soft drug crimes Hard drug crimes 
Policy Implementation  
– 2 Years 
-8.10 -4.17 -0.39 2.41 
(4.74) (4.68) (3.86) (4.29) 
Policy Implementation  
– 1 Years 
-17.08 -9.22 -5.19 0.41 
(11.09) (5.67) (5.09) (5.05) 
Policy Implementation -5.43 6.35 -2.12 6.29 (11.09) (7.34) (5.09) (4.96) 
Policy Implementation  
+ 1 Year 
-23.06 -7.35* -13.56* -2.36 
(11.81) (3.07) (5.64) (3.10) 
Policy Implementation  
+ 2 Years 
-25.85 -6.21 -15.33* -1.32 
(13.90) (4.18) (7.42) (2.47) 
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Linear time trend No Yes No Yes 
Observations 312 312 312 312 
R2 0.194 0.644 0.118 0.420 
Note:  ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01 
DD coefficient is captured by (ܦ௜  × ݀௧) in equation 2 
Clustered standard errors are grouped on municipal level and reported in 
parenthesis.  
Source: Statline databank   
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Table 10 
The impact of the drug policy firm revenues when using a placebo policy in 2010 and 2013 
Policy ≥ 2010 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Soft drug crimes Hard drug crimes 
Coffee shop municipalities  
× Policy2009_2014 
-15.90 -3.46 -7.32 2.67 
(8.86) (4.74) (4.44) 4.77 
Municipal fixed effects Yes Yes Ye Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Linear time trend No Yes No Yes 
Observations 312 312 312 312 
R2 0.160 0.623 0.068 0.403 
 
Policy ≥ 2013 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Coffee shop municipalities 
× Policy2009-2014 
-16.80* -9.15 -12.52* -9.00 
(8.10) (6.79) (4.60) (5.52) 
Municipal fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Linear time trend No Yes No Yes 
Observations 312 312 312 312 
R2 0.177 0.623 0.113 0.408 
Note:  ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01 
DD coefficient is captured by (ܦ௜  × ݀௧) in equation 1 
Clustered standard errors are grouped on municipal level and reported in 
parenthesis.  
Source: Statline databank 
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Figure 1: Coffee shop municipalities in the Netherlands 
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Figure 2: Common overlap between treatment- and control observations before and after matching 
 
Note:  Matching result based on the 1st propensity score specification using nearest-
neighbor logit model with up to four neighbors with a caliper of 25% of the standard deviation 
(0.045) 
 Matching leads to three treated coffee shop municipalities being labeled as “off-
support” indicating that no viable control coffee shop municipality was available within the 
caliper radius 
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Figure 3: Soft drug crime trend from 2005 to 2016 
 
 Note:  Green line signifies the start of policy implementation and enforcement in the 
Southern provinces of Limburg, Noord-Brabant, and Zeeland.  
  The large decrease in 2009 is due to two coffee shop municipalities, Bergen op 
Zoom in Noord-Brabant, and Roosendaal in Zeeland closing their coffee shops due to the issues 
associated with drug tourism 
